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This thesis contributes to the behavioral health literature and literature regarding
healthcare financial incentive programs by discussing the influences of the behavioral
economic concept of projection bias on programs designed to recruit healthcare providers
to rural or underserved areas. First, I propose an adaptation to the model of projection
bias by introducing a term that captures variability in individuals’ propensity to exhibit
projection bias based on the amount of effort expended in predicting future preferences.
Next, I conduct a probit model regression to observe what incentive program design
features and participant characteristics are likely to influence the probability of exhibiting
projection bias and therefore affect the efficacy of two incentive programs. Results
suggest that incentive programs targeted to students are more likely to experience higher
magnitudes of projection bias among participants, resulting in higher default rates,
compared to professional-targeted programs. This is potentially due to the temporal gap,
or length of time between when an individual decides to participate in the incentive
program, thereby agreeing to practice in a shortage area in the future, and carrying out the
service obligation. Furthermore, within the student-targeted program, the longer the
training of participants, the more prone they are to exhibit projection bias and default on
their obligation. This research also includes a survival analysis to identify what variables
are related to a longer length of practice in one’s initial shortage area.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Residents of nonmetropolitan areas, which are defined as communities with
populations under 50,000 residents, are one of the largest medically underserved
populations in the United States. Twenty percent of the U.S. population lives in
nonmetropolitan areas, yet less than ten percent of primary care providers practice in such
areas (Rosenblatt and Hart 2000). In addition to a geographic imbalance of healthcare
practitioners, nonmetropolitan residents suffer from higher rates of chronic diseases and
disability, report higher levels of obesity, are older on average, and are more likely to
report being in poorer health than their metropolitan counterparts (Ricketts 2000 and
USDA ERS 2009).
In response to this healthcare disparity, federal and state programs have been
established to incentivize healthcare providers to practice in geographic regions that have
been identified as having a shortage of primary care, dental, and mental healthcare
providers. Over 60 million Americans live in a shortage area for primary care, nearly 50
million live in a shortage area for dental care and nearly 100 million live in a shortage
area for mental health (U.S. DHHS 2016). At the federal level, these shortage areas are
called Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs) and can be geographic areas,
population groups, or facilities in which the number of healthcare providers falls beneath
a designated target. Nationally, over half of HPSA designations are in nonmetropolitan
counties, while in Nebraska, over 85 percent of the designations are in nonmetropolitan
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counties (U.S. DHHS 2016)1. Additionally, the State of Nebraska designates counties as
state-designated shortage areas to further identify healthcare provider needs within the
state.
Being designated a shortage area makes these areas eligible to benefit from
programs that incentivize providers to practice there. In Nebraska, two incentive
programs are administered from state funds, 1) the Nebraska Student Loan Program
(SLP), and 2) the Nebraska Loan Repayment Program (LRP). Although both programs
exist to help alleviate the healthcare disparity found in nonmetropolitan areas, the
programs have important differences in the structure and timing of healthcare providers’
decision to commit to serve in a state-designated shortage area in return for the incentive.
Under the SLP, the state awards forgivable student loans to medical, physician
assistant, dental, and graduate-level mental health students who agree to practice one year
in a state-designated shortage area for every year they accept the forgivable loan. This
incentive is received while participants are in professional school. Under the LRP,
licensed physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, dentists, pharmacists,
occupational and physical therapists, and mental healthcare providers receive funds to
pay back student loans over the course of three years once they begin to practice in a
state-designated shortage area. Both programs require that participants practice in a statedesignated shortage area for a certain period of time in exchange for the financial
incentive (NE DHHS 2015a). Both the SLP and LRP have experienced financial and
administrative changes over time. These changes include increased monetary incentives,
changes to the cost of defaulting—that is, not completing one’s practice obligation in a
1

Healthcare facilities in metropolitan areas may also be designated a Health Professional
Shortage Area and may be eligible to receive state and federal funds.
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shortage area—as well as sending service obligation reminders to participants of the SLP.
Table 1.1 summarizes the differences between the programs and changes in the programs
over time.
Previous studies have found differences in outcomes between student-targeted
and professional-targeted incentive programs. In this particular study, since its inception
in 1979, nearly 45 percent of SLP participants have failed to complete their practice
obligation, compared to only eight percent of LRP participants. This difference in
completion rate, given the structural differences of the programs, may be partially
explained by a behavioral economic concept known as projection bias. Projection bias
refers to an individual’s tendency to exaggerate the degree to which their future
preferences reflect their current preferences (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin
2003). In these incentive programs, the differences in timing of the decision to participate
in a program may lead to a higher probability of projection bias in the SLP compared to
the LRP. In the SLP, individuals commit to practicing in a state-designated shortage area
while attending school in exchange for a forgivable student loan. In this program, an
individual must predict their future preferences years in advance (up to seven years in the
case of a medical student), compared to LRP participants, who receive the incentive once
they are practicing and make their decision to participate a year or two before they begin
practice in a shortage area.
Other program design features may also contribute to the likelihood of individuals
exhibiting projection bias. For example, changes to the cost of default may influence the
perception of how costly or binding their decision to participate is. If the cost of
defaulting changes, it is possible that individuals will spend more time considering their
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true future practice preferences in order to make more accurate predictions, decreasing
the likelihood of defaulting on their obligation. Furthermore, participant characteristics
such as their background and previous experiences – e.g., whether that person has lived
in a nonmetropolitan area before or not – may also affect his or her ability to accurately
predict future preferences (Kahneman and Thaler 2006).
Projection bias provides a theoretical explanation for the observed differences in
default rate between the SLP and LRP, and the existence of projection bias would make a
program that requires individuals to commit to practicing in a shortage area years in
advance inherently less successful than one that has a shorter time lag between
committing to a shortage area and carrying out the decision. These differences in
completion rate suggest that design features of incentive programs should be carefully
considered in light of projection bias. By understanding what program and personal
characteristics exacerbate or counteract the magnitude of projection bias, thereby
affecting the outcomes of financial incentive programs, similar state and federal
healthcare incentive programs can adapt policies and processes to positively influence the
success rate of recruiting healthcare providers to serve high need populations.
1.2 Objectives
The first objective of this research is to apply a model of projection bias to
healthcare incentive programs. First, this research proposes an adaptation to the model of
projection bias by introducing a term that captures variability in individuals’ propensity
to exhibit projection bias based on the amount of effort an individual expends in
predicting their future preferences. This modification suggests that the perception of how
binding a decision is influences the magnitude of projection bias. Next, this project
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examines how program design features such as the timing of when an incentive is
received or the cost of default influence one’s likelihood of exhibiting projection bias,
thereby effecting program outcomes. This objective addresses the influence of projection
bias on the efficacy of incentive programs created to recruit healthcare providers into
state-designated shortage areas.
The second objective of this research is to examine the implications of projection
bias and program design on the length of service in one’s initial practice location.
Specifically, this research will observe the length of practice among participants’ initial
shortage area practice locations and discuss which individual and program design
variables are most predictive of longer retention of healthcare providers.
1.3. Contribution to the Literature
This research contributes to literature in the behavioral economics and rural health
fields. First, this thesis extends the theory of projection bias by introducing a variable
expected to influence the magnitude of bias exhibited by individuals. Additionally, it
proposes that program design can induce or reduce the occurrence of projection bias,
demonstrating that structural features of programs may influence the quality of decisions
individuals make. While the effectiveness of healthcare financial incentive programs has
been well researched, this analysis applies behavioral economic principles to describe
why similar programs experience different outcomes. Looking at financial incentive
programs through the lens of behavioral economics provides a new perspective and
potential strategies to improve program outcomes.
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1.4 Definition of Rural
Because the majority of healthcare shortage areas in Nebraska are in places that
would be considered “rural,” it is important to establish a precise definition of the term
that will be used throughout this thesis. Although several definitions of rural exist, the
key dimension of rural is geographic dispersion of population and lesser access to
markets for services and jobs (USDA ERS 2009). This research utilized the Office of
Management and Budget’s (OMB) county-based metropolitan and nonmetropolitan
classification because this definition is used extensively at the federal level for healthcare
policy, including programs designed to increase healthcare providers in rural areas (Hart,
Larson and Lischner 2005).
As of 2013, the OMB defined metropolitan (metro) counties as broad labormarket areas that include central locations with one or more urbanized core – i.e., cities
with a population greater than or equal to 50,000 – and outlying counties that are
economically tied to the core, as measured by labor-force commuting. Nonmetropolitan
(nonmetro) counties are outside the boundaries of metro areas and are further subdivided
into two types. Micropolitan (micro) areas are nonmetro labor-market areas centered on
populations between 10,000-49,999 and outlying counties that are economically tied to
the core. Noncore counties are all remaining nonmetro counties because they are not part
of the “core-based” metro or micro areas (U.S. OMB 2013). Based on these definitions,
the State of Nebraska has 13 metropolitan, 17 micropolitan, and 63 noncore counties as
of 2013 (U.S. OMB 2013).
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1.5 Description of Incentive Programs
The State of Nebraska’s Department of Health and Human Services, Office of
Rural Health designates state shortage areas every three years. These designations are
based on a variety of variables including physician-to-population ratio, proportion of
elderly population, proportion of population below the poverty level, health indicators
such as infant mortality rate and low birth rate, and the age of existing healthcare
workforce in the geographic region (NE DHHS 2015b). Descriptions of the SLP and LRP
incentive programs that are funded and administered by the State of Nebraska are
outlined below. A summary of this information can be found in Table 1.1.
1.5.1 Incentive Amounts and Eligible Recipients
Under the SLP, the state awards forgivable student loans to Nebraska medical,
physician assistant, dental, and graduate-level mental health students who agree to
practice for one year in an approved specialty, state-designated shortage area for every
year they accept the incentive. The nominal incentive amount has changed over time.
This program started in 1979 by awarding low-interest loans to medical students. In
1991, the program switched from providing low-interest loans to forgivable student loans
to Nebraska medical and physician assistant students in the amount of $10,000 and
$5,000 per year, respectively. In 1998, the nominal incentive value increased and more
professions became eligible. The SLP awarded forgivable student loans in the amount of
$20,000 to Nebraska medical and dental students, and $10,000 to physician assistant and
master’s level mental health students (NE DHHS 2015a).
The LRP is available to physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants
practicing in primary care specialties – e.g., family practice, general internal medicine,
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general pediatrics, obstetrics/gynecology, general surgery, and psychiatry – dentists,
clinical psychologists, licensed mental health practitioners, pharmacists, occupational
therapists, and physical therapists. Under the LRP, participating healthcare providers
receive funds, provided from a 50-50 state and local match, to pay back student loans for
three years once they begin to practice in a state-designated shortage area. Beginning in
1994, primary care physicians, dentists, and psychologists received up to $20,000 per
year for three years, and nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and master's level
mental health professionals received up to a $10,000 per year for three years. Dentists,
pharmacists, and occupational and physical therapists were added to program eligibility
in 1998. In 2006, the per-year incentive increased to $40,000 and $20,000, respectively.
These funds require the recipient to complete a three-year practice obligation in a statedesignated shortage area (NE DHHS 2015a).
1.5.2 Timing of Incentive Received
One important distinction between these two programs is the timing of the
delivery of the incentive. In the SLP, individuals receive the incentive while in
professional school, and by participating, agree to practice in a state-designated shortage
area years before they are licensed to practice. LRP participants receive the incentive
once they are licensed and a practicing professional. LRP participants choose to
participate in the program towards the end of their training and typically make the
decision to participate in this program a year or two before beginning practice in shortage
area.
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1.5.3 Default Cost and Administrative Changes
Failure to practice in a state-designated shortage area for the time required of
these incentive programs results in a default outcome. Default may occur prior to
practicing in a shortage area, in the case of the SLP, or it may occur after beginning
practice in a shortage area if an individual moves practice locations prior to completing
the time required of the obligation.
Failure to complete a practice obligation comes at a financial cost to the program
participant. While the cost of default under the LRP has remained constant over time for
the sample in the study – 125 percent of funds received – the SLP has implemented
administrative and default cost changes over time. Prior to 1998, in default condition one
(DC1), the cost of default was 24 percent simple interest from the date the incentive was
received. Administrative changes were made in 1998, which marks the beginning of
default condition two (DC2). At this time, SLP participants began receiving semi-annual
letters reminding them of their practice obligation to the State of Nebraska and the cost to
the individuals if they defaulted on their obligation. Participants received these letters
twice a year until their obligation was completed. The default cost remained at 24 percent
simple interest from the date the incentive was received. In 2007, the beginning of default
condition three (DC3), the default cost changed to 150 percent principal plus 8 percent
simple interest from the date of default. The semi-annual letters continued in this
condition (NE DHHS 2015a).
1.6 Organization of Work
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature regarding the efficacy of healthcare
financial incentive programs at recruiting and retaining healthcare providers in shortage
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areas. Additionally, this chapter discusses the influence of projection bias on economic
and medical decisions and what may cause projection bias among financial incentive
programs. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical framework of projection bias as it relates to
healthcare financial incentive programs and proposes a modification to the model of
simple projection bias. This chapter also derives hypotheses of variables expected to be
influenced by projection bias. Chapter 4 discusses the sample used in this research and
provides summary statistics of the data. The empirical models – i.e., probit model and
survival analysis models including a Kaplain-Meier survival probability and cox
proportional hazards regression – used to test hypotheses are discussed in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 provides results and discussion of the analysis, and a summary of this research
is discussed in Chapter 7.

11
Table 1.1
Nebraska Rural Health Incentive Program Descriptions
Student Loan (SLP)
Received as student

Loan Repayment (LRP)
Received as licensed
professional

Practice Obligation

One year service per year
incentive received

3-years

Eligible Professions

Medical, dental,
physician assistant, and
graduate-level mental health
students

Incentive Amount

Varies by Period:
1: Low-interest loan
2: Forgivable Loan
(10K, 5K)
3: Forgivable Loan
(20K, 10K)

Physicians, nurse
practitioners, and physician
assistants in primary care
specialties;
dentists, psychologists,
licensed mental health
practitioners,
pharmacists, occupational
therapists, and
physical therapists
Varies by Period
4: 20K, 10K (per year)
5: 40K, 20K (per year)
(50-50 state & local match)

Timing of Incentive

1: 1979-1990
2: 1991-1997
3: 1998-2015
4: 1994-2005
5: 2006-2015

Default Cost &
Administrative
Oversight2
1: 1979-1997
2: 1998-2006
3: 2007-2015
4: 1994-2015

Overall Average
Default Rate

2

Varies by Period
1: 24% interest
2: 24% interest & semiannual letter
3: 150% principal + 8%
interest & semi-annual
letter

4:125% funds received

43%

8%

Default cost in the LRP has changed from 125% since 2015, but does not affect the
sample included in the research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Rural Healthcare Disparities
The persistent concern about access to healthcare services among vulnerable
populations, including residents of nonmetropolitan areas, has prompted innovative
solutions and policy interventions to help address the issue. Some of these efforts include
utilizing telehealth to extend and improve access to care for those facing geographic
barriers to healthcare services, a solution particularly useful among the behavioral
healthcare field (Ricketts 2000); focusing on public health, or population-based
preventive approaches that address systematic factors influencing health of a population
such as diabetes, mental health, or use of tobacco (Hartley 2004); training a diverse
workforce of those most likely to practice among underserved populations (Jackson and
Gracia 2014); exposing students to underserved populations by working in free clinics
while in training (VanderWielen et al. 2015); and incentivizing healthcare providers to
practice in healthcare provider shortage areas by relieving debt incurred during training.
Expanding programs or creating new interventions such as the examples above is
becoming even more important as the demand for healthcare services continues to grow.
Petterson et al. (2012) estimate that the U.S. will require almost 52,000 additional
primary care physicians by 2025 to meet future demand. This estimate is calculated by
accounting for the number of primary care office visits, U.S. Census Bureau population
and demographic change projections, and the current supply of primary care providers
according to the American Medical Association Masterfile (Petterson et al. 2012).
Population growth is the key driver of growing demand for healthcare, followed by an
aging population as well as an expected increase in demand due to expanded medical
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coverage through the Affordable Care Act (Petterson et. al 2012 and IHS Inc. 2015).
These estimates, however, do not consider the geographic distribution of healthcare
providers, and the key drivers of demand will exacerbate the geographic health disparities
if population growth, newly insured, or aging residents are clustered in areas already
experiencing shortages of healthcare providers (Petterson et al. 2012).
One strategy to increase the number of providers in shortage areas is to offer
financial incentives. Two common incentives include student- and professional-targeted
programs. Student-targeted programs involve incentives such as low-interest or
forgivable educational loans or scholarships. In these programs, students commit early in
their healthcare education to practice in a designated shortage area upon completion of
training in exchange for the incentive. Alternatively, in professional-targeted programs,
participants commit near the completion of their training to practice in a designated
shortage area in exchange for assistance in repaying educational loans acquired earlier as
students (Bärnighausen and Bloom 2009a).
Through these programs, participating healthcare providers enter into a legally
binding contract to work for a specified number of years in a medically underserved area
in exchange for a financial pay-off (Bärnighausen and Bloom 2009a). Incentive programs
vary by the amount of financial incentive received, penalty for defaulting on the contract,
the timing of when the incentive is received, type of commitment, and professions
eligible to participate (Bärnighausen and Bloom 2009b).
Efforts like these to increase the supply of, or redistribute, healthcare providers in
order to increase access and quality of care requires that policy-makers understand the
economic and psychological forces at play when individuals face decisions of where to
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practice. Increasing the value of practicing in an underserved area by increasing the
monetary payoff for doing so by providing financial incentives may help correct for the
misdistribution. However, there are additional psychological factors that are likely to
influence the outcome of programs that are intended to recruit professionals to areas in
need of healthcare professionals. Looking at the issue of healthcare disparities through
the lens of behavioral economics could provide new insights into the way that healthcare
financial incentive programs are designed and delivered.
2.2 Behavioral Economics
The field of behavioral economics seeks to improve upon theoretical frameworks
of neoclassical economics by incorporating psychological foundations to make better
predictions of behavior (Camerer and Loewenstein 2004). An assumption of neoclassical
economics is that individuals are rational, utility-maximizing agents. However, in certain
instances, individuals tend to exhibit irrational behaviors that are not accounted for in
neoclassical models. For example, one’s attitude towards risk is influenced by a reference
point and framing, resulting in risk-aversion when facing gains and risk seeking when
facing losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Behavioral economics begins with rational
agent models and introduces cognitive limitations of humans to more accurately explain
and predict behavior. Behavioral economic insights can help explain common findings
and outcomes of financial incentive programs by investigating how program design
features may unintentionally induce biases—such as projection bias—that undermine the
effectiveness of the program.
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2.2.1 Projection Bias
To correctly make intertemporal decisions, individuals must know how their
tastes will change over time. While neoclassical economic models assume individuals
understand the distribution of their changes in taste, projection bias suggests that while
individuals may be able to anticipate the direction of their changes in preferences–e.g.,
eating appetizers will diminish one’s appetite for dinner or winning the lottery will
improve one’s quality of life–individuals systematically misestimate the magnitude of
these changes (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003). This is known as projection
bias, or the tendency to exaggerate the degree to which one’s future preferences reflect
current preferences (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003). For example, one may
schedule an overly warm summer vacation destination if planning the vacation during the
winter, or a healthy individual may overestimate the impact that being diagnosed with a
chronic disease will have on their quality of life. Current preferences are dependent upon
a number of factors including mood, environment, habits, or previous experiences, and
empirical studies have found that individuals systematically misestimate how their tastes
and preferences will change when their psychological state, mood, or environment
change (Loewenstein 2000; Grable, Lytton and O’Neill 2004; Lucey and Dowling 2005).
The inability to anticipate how one’s preferences will change undermines the
quality of decisions that individuals make (Loewenstein 2005). Projection bias has been
shown to influence behavior in a variety of domains, including the medical field (Slevin
et al. 1988, Bernabei et al. 1998, Loewenstein 2005, and Halpern and Arnold 2008). A
study by Slevin et al. (1988) found that individuals in a state of health inaccurately
predicted what their treatment preferences would be after becoming ill. More specifically,
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the researchers found that patients with cancer were much more likely to opt for radical
medical treatment, even with a small chance of benefit, compared to healthy non-patients.
Only 10 percent of healthy non-patients said they would accept a grueling treatment of
chemotherapy to extend their life by three months, compared to 42 percent of cancer
patients. Moorman and Carr (2008) studied elderly spouses’ hypothetical end-of-life
treatment decisions for their incapacitated spouses. Results showed that surrogate
spouses– i.e., those making treatment decision that they believed their incapacitated
spouses would choose– accurately predicted the incapacitated spouses’ true treatment
preferences between 62% and 77% of the time, demonstrating that projection bias also
exists between individuals in different states.
Projection bias has also been found to influence economic decisions. A study by
Grable, Lytton and O’Neill (2010) found that the previous week’s closing prices,
influenced by short-term price changes, changed investors’ risk tolerance attitudes the
subsequent week. Based on psychological evidence, Loewenstein et al. (2001) and Lucey
and Dowling (2005) proposed that one’s feelings or mood drives financial decisions
involving uncertainty, and Lo, Repin, and Steenbarger (2005) found that trader’s who
exhibit intense emotional reactions to market events such as price volatility performed
worse than those who had lesser emotional reactions, indicating that one’s emotional
state influences decisions made in that state. Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin
(2003) demonstrated how projection bias could cause individuals to consume too much
early in life and too little later in life. The authors also proposed that projection bias could
cause misguided purchases of durable goods. For instance, people’s valuation of durable
goods fluctuate daily, and projection bias would suggest that individuals will over-
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purchase durable goods on high-valuation days.
2.3 Recruitment Efficacy of Incentive Programs
Current literature addresses the effectiveness of financial incentive programs in
both recruiting and retaining healthcare providers in high need communities. The
effectiveness of financial incentive programs varies and depends on many factors like
design elements of the programs, including length of time between commitment and
service, the length of service commitment, freedom in choosing practice location, as well
as expectations about quality of life during the service commitment and the mission of
the work involved (Miller and Crittenden 2001).
Jackson et al. (2003) found that state programs that recruit students had
significantly lower recruitment success than state programs that recruit healthcare
workers after their training. Pathman et al. (2004) support this finding through a study of
state-funded healthcare incentive programs, reporting that student-targeted programs that
obligate students to practice in shortage areas early in their training have the lowest
completion rates, ranging from 44 percent to 66.5 percent. However, programs that
recruit providers towards the end of their training have a completion rate of 92 percent
(Pathman et al. 2004), confirming that recruiting participants closer to the end of their
training, or closer to the time of starting practice, will result in higher completion rates.
2.3.1 Projection Bias and Financial Incentive Programs
The differences in completion rates among programs that require commitment
near the beginning of training versus those that require commitment shortly before
individuals begin practicing may be explained by projection bias. The differences in
timing of the decision to participate between student-targeted and professional-targeted
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programs may lead to a greater likelihood of projection bias among student-targeted
programs. It is likely that students participating in student-targeted incentive programs
believe that their preferences for primary care specialties (or other professions eligible to
receive funds) and for working in a nonmetropolitan, underserved community will be the
same upon completion of their training. However, individuals may fail to account for
how their preferences may change over the course of several years and are more likely to
exhibit biased predictions of their future tastes the further into the future they are
predicting.
2.4 Relevant Causes of Projection Bias
2.4.1 Insensitivity to Temporal Location
Increasing the length of time between making a decision and experiencing the
consequences of that decision contributes to a higher probability of projection bias.
People do not always know what their preferences will be in the future, because it is
cognitively demanding for people to imagine their tastes, and individuals are likely to
make the most incorrect predictions about their future tastes when the temporal gap is
long (Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Individuals create mental representations of future
events, called simulations, in order to imagine consequences about an event that has not
yet occurred (Gilbert and Wilson 2007). People use their immediate reactions to these
simulations to predict their reactions or preferences when the event comes about.
However, errors in prospection occur because not all features of an experience are
included in the simulation, even though some of these excluded features may have a
profound impact on the future experience. For example, a young couple that imagines the
joy of owning their own home but fails to imagine the burden of home repair or yard
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upkeep may overestimate how much they will enjoy home ownership. The tendency of
individuals to neglect certain features of an event increases as the event becomes more
temporally distant (Gilbert and Wilson 2007).
Imagining individual preferences months or years into the future increases the
probability that an error in prediction will occur. Gilbert, Gill and Wilson (2002) suggest
that people consider the temporal location of events only after first imagining the events
happening in the present. Because individuals are insensitive to length of time,
predictions of future preferences and associated utility are strongly anchored on present
states.
2.4.2 Salience of Outcome Attributes
Anchoring to preferences in the present psychological state causes errors of
predicted preferences if one aspect of an outcome is salient at the time the decision is
made but a different aspect is prominent when the decision is experienced (Kahneman
and Thaler 2006). For example, when purchasing a gym membership, the health benefits
of exercising are salient at the time of purchase, but when making the decision of whether
or not to exercise at the gym, other factors such as time constraints or level of motivation
may be more influential in deciding whether or not to actually exercise. Forecasts about
future preferences that are based on some attribute of an outcome, such as health, are
likely to be incorrect if the same attribute is not focused on at the point in time in the
future when the decision is being carried out.
If, for example, the attribute of receiving a significant financial incentive in the
near future is salient when agreeing to participate in the SLP, but is no longer salient in
the future when making practice location decisions, it is more likely that the provider will
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default on their obligation. In the LRP, the incentive is more likely to be salient when
recipients carry out their obligation, as it’s received during the contract fulfillment.
Ensuring that the benefits and costs of participation are considered when enrolling and
carrying out service obligations has potential to decrease projection bias.
2.4.3 Underappreciating Adaptation
In addition to underappreciating how one’s preferences will change when his or
her visceral state – i.e., hunger, anger, cravings – changes, individuals also underestimate
their ability to adapt to major life events. This misestimation of how one adapts can cause
bias in predicted preferences or quality of life expectations. Psychological research
consistently shows that individuals underestimate their ability to adapt to adversity
(Halpern and Arnold 2008). Gilbert et al. (1998) examined a variety of situations where
individuals overestimated the duration and intensity of their reaction to negative events.
Assistant professors overestimated the impact that approval or denial of tenure would
have on their life (after comparing to reports of former assistant professors), patients on a
kidney transplant list overestimated the impact of denial or approval of an organ
transplant, and students who had yet to experience a romantic break-up anticipated their
sadness would last longer than what was reported by those who had experienced a
romantic break-up. Similar results were found in situations for job seekers being rejected
by a potential employer, losing a political election, and receiving negative feedback,
suggesting that individuals overestimate the length of their reaction to adverse events
(Gilbert et al. 1998). In general, individuals have biased expectations about the duration
and intensity of emotions due to underappreciating the ability to adapt with time.
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Adaptation is the process of adjusting to new or changed circumstances, and can
include cognitive adaptation, such as changes in goals or interests (Dolan and Kahneman
2008). In the case of healthcare financial incentive programs, individuals may
underappreciate how their interests in various specialties or preferences for practice
locations will change over time as they encounter new experiences. However, prompting
individuals to more carefully consider their future preferences may reduce projection
bias.
In emotional adaptation experiments conducted by Ubel, Loewenstein and Jepson
(2005), the researchers asked participants to estimate their quality of life associated with
paraplegia before and after an adaptation exercise. They found that asking individuals to
reflect on how they would adapt to becoming paraplegic over time led to increased–and
less biased–quality of life estimates. Further, results indicated that the greater attention
drawn to the process of adaptation, the greater the impact the adaptation exercise had on
individual responses.
2.5 Program Design Elements
Some incentive programs have stipulations to increase the likelihood of
completing service obligations, such as hefty financial penalties for defaulting.
Bärnighausen and Bloom (2009a) determined that the proportion of participants who
fulfilled their service obligation did not differ significantly between programs that did
impose a cost for defaulting and those that did not. The authors suggest that this indicates
participants who default on their obligation make the decision to do so independently of
the conditions of the program they are enrolled in. However, contrary to this finding,
Pathman et al. (2004) found that the cost of buyout among student-targeted incentive
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programs was related to completion rates. The researchers report that very high default
costs appear to cut default rates by one-third (Pathman et al. 2004a). Student-targeted
programs experienced 80 percent completion rates by charging penalties three times the
amount of support provided, compared to less than 50 percent completion rates for the
programs with lesser default penalties. Although default costs appear to decrease default
rates among student-targeted programs, these costs were also associated with lower
satisfaction and shorter retention. While the researchers did not examine the influence of
changing default costs within programs, Pathman et al. (2004a) found no relationship
between completion rates and default cost within loan repayment programs.
Additional strategies to increase the probability of program completion include
targeting individual characteristics for recruitment. One commonly used strategy is to
select program candidates based on characteristics believed to be associated with a high
probability of completing service obligations. There is strong evidence that healthcare
providers from nonmetropolitan, or shortage area, backgrounds are more likely to choose
to practice in these areas compared to their urban peers (Daniels et al. 2007 and
Rabinowitz et al. 2001), and Hensel et al. (2007) estimated that nonmetro physicians are
four to five times more likely to have grown up in a nonmetro community compared to
physicians with a metropolitan background. Additionally, individuals with a
nonmetropolitan upbringing who participate in incentive programs may be less likely to
exhibit projection bias, resulting in higher completion rates, as they are more easily able
to model their future preferences for living in a shortage area compared to an individual
who has not lived in a rural area. Gilbert and Wilson (2007) support this claim, stating
that memories are the building blocks of simulating one’s reaction to future events.
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In a study conducted at the University of Kentucky College of Medicine,
researchers reported that the strongest predictor of student interest in nonmetropolitan
practice locations was a positive opinion of the quality of life in these areas (Curran and
Rourke 2004). Curran and Rourke (2004) discussed that opinion and attitude about life in
nonmetro areas can be influenced by experiences of growing up in nonmetro areas,
frequent exposure to practicing in these settings while in medical training, and
encouragement from faculty and institutions to pursue primary care related fields.
2.6 Retention
Service-requiring programs aid in recruiting healthcare providers into underserved
regions, but to reduce the long-term prevalence of these healthcare disparities it is
important for providers to remain practicing in these areas. The proportion of servicerequiring program participants who remained in underserved areas after completing their
obligation3 ranged from 12 percent to 90 percent across eighteen retention studies
reviewed by Bärnighausen and Bloom (2009a). The longest retention by program type
was held by loan repayment participants—nearly 80 percent remained in their service site
five years after beginning service, and 66 percent remained after eight years. Shorter
retention was found for scholarship participants, with around 50 percent remaining in
their service site five years after starting work there (Pathman et al. 2004b).
Research demonstrated that participants in financial incentive programs were less
likely than non-participants to remain in their first underserved practice area (Pathman,
Konrad, and Ricketts 1992; Pathman, Konrad, and Ricketts 1994). However, participants

The length of obligation and definition of retention varies across programs. Therefore,
the percentages reported indicate the proportion of participants who remained in their
service obligation location beyond the time stipulated by their contract.
3

24
were more likely to practice in some underserved area or to work with an underserved
population compared to their non-participating peers over the long run (Bärnighausen and
Bloom 2009a). The literature discusses many factors that contribute to heightened
retention, such as workplace fit, community satisfaction, and familial satisfaction. Studies
have found that demographics and backgrounds of incentive program participants are not
related to how satisfied they are in a nonmetro or underserved area, or how long they
remain practicing in their initial shortage area (Singer et al. 1998 and Pathman et al.
2004).
These findings suggest that the types of incentives used to retain doctors in
underserved areas may differ from incentives designed to recruit them (Buykx et al.
2010). Li et al. (2014) conducted choice experiments among nonmetropolitan general
practitioners in Australia and found that increasing the availability of a substitute general
practitioner would have the largest impact in improving retention of physicians in
isolated areas, followed by increased retention payments and additional compensation for
complex services and geographic isolation from specialists.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A fundamental assumption of neoclassical economics is that individuals are
rational beings who make choices that maximize utility. However, findings from
behavioral economic research provides evidence that individuals do not always make
decisions that yield maximized utility over time, in part because they fail to consider or
accurately predict what their tastes and preferences will be in the future, and instead rely
heavily on current emotions or recent events in making decisions (Hsee and Hastie 2006).
Standard economic theory requires that individuals know the distribution of their
preferences throughout time, yet behavioral economic evidence suggests otherwise. For
example, hungry shoppers are more likely to purchase high-calorie foods compared to
satiated shoppers (Tal and Wansink 2013); individuals are more likely to return warm
clothing if the items were ordered on a day that was colder than when the items were
received (Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vogelsang 2007); and many purchasers of annual
gym memberships quit going to the gym within a few months (Della Vigna and
Malmendier 2006). These examples demonstrate that preferences change and that
individuals imperfectly predict their changing preferences. Psychological evidence
supports that individuals understand qualitatively the direction of their changes in
preferences – e.g., being diagnosed with a chronic illness will decrease one’s quality of
life – but individuals systematically misestimate the magnitude of these changes
(Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 1978; Gilbert et al. 1998; Ubel, Loewenstein, and
Jepson 2005).
Failure to accurately predict future preferences undermines the quality of
decisions that people make (Loewenstein 2005), and may have serious health and
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economic implications. The existing literature discusses the causes of projection bias and
identifies its prevalence across economic decisions and domains. Loewenstein,
O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) have developed a model of simple projection bias, and
this chapter proposes an adaptation to this model by introducing a term expected to
decrease individuals’ propensity to exhibit projection bias. Additionally, this chapter
presents hypotheses about projection bias in the context of the incentive programs and
discusses which variables within this analysis are expected to be related to projection bias
among participants of healthcare financial incentive programs.
3.1 Rationale for Modifying Simple Model of Projection Bias

Figure 3.1: Timeline for Decisions
The general decision timeline for participating in the SLP or LRP and for
completing service obligations is described in Figure 3.1. The length of time between
each decision point is representative of an average medical student or licensed physician.
Upon entering professional school at time period A, individuals can choose to participate
in the SLP program in exchange for practicing in a shortage area beginning at time period
C. During the latter part of training, participants face the decision to participate in the
LRP at time period B. At point D, participants will have completed their serviceobligation. If participants fail to practice in a shortage area for the length of time required
by their contract, illustrated as the length of time between periods C and D, they incur a
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default cost, c. This cost depends upon the default cost condition imposed during their
participation.
The objective of healthcare financial incentive programs is to recruit healthcare
providers to practice in areas with a low provider-to-population ratio. Thus, having
participants fulfill their practice obligation – i.e., reach point D on the timeline in Figure
3.1 – is the desired outcome of such programs. Because participants choose to participate
in these programs at point A or B and do not experience the consequences of their
decision until point C, it is important to consider how their preferences may change over
time, and how these changes influences the likelihood of a completed program outcome.
In order to increase the likelihood of a completed program outcome, reducing the
propensity of projection bias exhibited among participants should help reach this desired
outcome. I expect that projection bias is higher when a decision is perceived to be less
binding because one would expect individuals to spend less time and cognitive resources
considering the consequences of their decisions when there is no or little cost to being
wrong. Alternatively, I expect the magnitude of projection bias to decrease when a
decision is perceived to be more binding, encouraging individuals to carefully consider
their future preferences. Ubel, Loewenstein and Jepson (2005) found that prompting
individuals to think about how they adapt to changes over time led to a reduction in bias,
indicating that the more individuals are prompted to consider how their preferences will
change over time, the less likely they are to make biased predictions regarding their
future.
I propose that both monetary and non-monetary program elements can affect the
probability that projection bias occurs. The cost of defaulting on a practice obligation
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may influence the likelihood of projection bias occurring by encouraging individuals to
devote more effort to predicting future preferences. Regular reminders of practice
obligations from program administrators are likely to maintain the salience of incentive
attributes. The SLP generated three different default cost conditions where some
participants faced higher default costs than others (see Table 1.1). I anticipate that the
default cost, along with receiving letters reminding participants of their service
obligation, contributes to the perception of how binding it is to participate in these
financial incentive programs. I propose that the more costly it becomes to mispredict
one’s future preferences, or the more bound one feels to fulfilling their obligation, the
less likely they are to exhibit projection bias and default on their obligation. Therefore,
the perception of how binding the choice to participate in an incentive program is will
affect the occurrence of projection bias among participants. I therefore propose an
adaptation to the model of projection bias to include a variable that captures the perceived
cost—at the time of the initial decision—of incorrectly predicting one’s future
preferences.
3.2 Modified Model of Projection Bias
The decision to participate in a financial incentive program depends upon how
much relative utility individuals expect to derive from the decision to participate in the
incentive program versus not participating. The model of projection bias developed by
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) uses state-dependent utility given by u(cτ,
sτ), where c is consumption and s is the psychological “state” that parameterizes their
preferences in period τ. Fully rational individuals are able to correctly predict their future
preferences and make decisions while in current state s’ that maximize their predicted
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utility. For individuals who correctly predict their future preferences, predicted utility is
equal to their true utility, 𝑢(c, s | s’) = u(c, s). Individuals exhibiting projection bias also
attempt to maximize utility; however, true future utility will differ from current and
predicted utility due to the influence of projection bias.
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin’s (2003) model of projection bias posits
that predicted utility is a weighted combination of true future utility and current utility
using weights of α and (1- α), where the magnitude of projection bias is denoted by α.
Accordingly, there exists an α ∈ [0, 1] such that for all c, s, and s’, ũ(c, s | s’) = (1 – α)
u(c, s) + α u(c, s’). Because α is a value between 0 and 1, predicted utility will fall
somewhere between current utility and true utility in the future. If α = 0, individuals
predict their future preferences accurately and no projection bias occurs. When α = 1,
individuals predict that their future preferences are identical to current preferences. As α
tends to 1, more projection bias occurs.
I propose that a binding variable, β, which represents how binding a decision is
perceived to be, will influence the magnitude of projection bias, represented by α, by
affecting the cognitive resources invested in envisioning future preferences. Thus, the
projection bias parameter is a function of how binding the decision is—α(β)—where
α'<0. With this adaptation, predicted utility in the presence of projection bias is now
denoted by
ũ(c, s | s’) = (1 – α(β)) u(c,s) + α(β) u(c,s’). (1)
For the utility derived from healthcare financial incentive programs, I propose that
utility is a function of the value of incentive received described by 𝜇, the perceived utility
of practicing in a designated shortage area described by 𝛾, and the actual utility of
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practicing in a shortage area described by 𝜀, which is unknown at the time of making a
participation decision, given a person’s current state, s’. Thus, utility is denoted as
𝑢 𝜇, 𝛾, 𝜀 𝑠′). A similar utility function has been used by Conlin, O’Donoghue, and
Vogelsang (2007) to test the presence of projection bias in catalog orders for cold
weather clothing. Now, applying the binding variable to the predicted utility model for
healthcare provider incentive programs, predicted utility is denoted by
ũ 𝜇, 𝛾, 𝜀, 𝑠 𝑠′) = (1 – α(β)) u(𝜇, 𝛾, 𝜀, 𝑠) + α(β) u(𝜇, 𝛾, 𝜀, 𝑠′). (2)
If participants believe their decision to participate is binding, which is a function
of their default condition, it is likely they will spend more time predicting what their true
preferences will be for working in a shortage area, decreasing the magnitude of projection
bias and increasing the likelihood participants will complete their service obligation.4
After individuals choose whether to participate in the program, the next decision
of consequence that they make, which is observed in the data, is whether to complete
their practice obligation. Intuitively, individuals will complete their practice obligation if
the difference between their ideal practice location, denoted by L* in state s, and their
current utility from practicing in a shortage area (SA) in state s, is less than the cost, c,
incurred from defaulting on their contract, described by
u(L* | s) – u(SA | s) < c.

(3).

It is possible for an individual’s ideal practice location to be in a shortage area, in which
case the left side of the equation would equal zero. This equation suggests that even if a

Embedding this model into an intertemporal choice scenario was considered. However,
because there is a delay in receiving the incentive in both programs, it is unlikely that
individuals are exhibiting quasi-hyperbolic discounting that would result in a preference
reversal in one program but not the other. Therefore, an intertemporal choice model is not
critical to model decision-making in this situation.
4

31
shortage area is not one’s ideal practice location preference, if the cost of default is
greater than the difference in utility between their ideal location and shortage area
location, they will complete their service obligation.
Conversely, individuals will default on their practice obligation if the difference
between their ideal practice location in state s and their current utility from practicing in a
shortage area in state s is greater than or equal to the cost incurred from defaulting on
their service obligation, described by
u(L* | s) – u(SA | s) ≥ c.

(4)

If an individual’s ideal location provides a much higher level of utility than the shortage
area location, it may be preferable to incur the cost of default in order to relocate to their
preferred location. If great enough differences in the level of utility exist between their
ideal and shortage area location, individuals are likely to default on their service
obligation.
3.3 Hypotheses Derived from Model
This research seeks to identify variables that contribute to or detract from the
likelihood of exhibiting projection bias among individuals participating in healthcare
financial incentive programs. The following hypotheses, derived from the models above,
discuss what variables I expect to exacerbate or counteract the forces of projection bias in
healthcare financial incentive programs.
First, I expect that changes in monetary and non-monetary elements of the default
conditions will increase participants’ efforts in predicting future preferences and will
decrease the likelihood of projection bias. Thus, in my first hypothesis (HP1), I expect
participants in default condition two (DC2) and default condition three (DC3) will be less
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likely to default on their service obligation because they perceive the commitment to
participate to be a more binding decision. Since participants in default condition one
(DC1) did not receive semi-annual reminders, they therefore may have felt that their
commitment was less binding compared to those who did receive semi-annual letters,
reminding them of their obligation and the cost of default until their obligation was
fulfilled. The default condition influences how bound the participant feels to their
decision to participate, affecting β in equations one and two. Equations three and four
also suggest that changes to the cost of default, c, may make individuals less likely to
default on their service obligation, increasing the likelihood of a completed outcome.
While perceived higher default costs could decrease the number of individuals
participating in the programs overall, those who do participate after carefully considering
their future preferences, induced by a more binding contract, are less likely to exhibit
higher levels of projection bias. Therefore, I expect that changes to the default cost will
lead to higher probability of participants completing their service obligations.
The value of the incentive received is directly related to the utility of participating
in the SLP and LRP. The nominal value of the incentive has changed over time within
both programs. While the nominal value changed at specific times in both programs, the
real value of the incentives has varied in every year. In hypothesis two (H2) I anticipate
that the higher the incentive value, the greater the magnitude of projection bias and the
more likely one is to default on their service obligation. If the value of the incentive rises,
increasing the utility of participating, enrolling in a program may become more enticing
to individuals who would otherwise be unlikely to consider practicing in a shortage area.
Higher incentive values may also make this aspect of the program more salient, and the
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difference in timing of the receipt of benefits may differentially affect continued attribute
salience in the two programs. In the LRP, program benefits should still be salient while
they are participating because they receive the benefits at that time, while SLP
participants’ benefit levels are no longer salient at the time they decide whether or not to
default. Although increased incentive values may increase the total number of
participants in the program, I anticipate it will increase the likelihood of projection bias,
as individuals who may not have a true preference for practicing in shortage areas are
participating, and are doing so based on the financial incentive it provides5.
In hypothesis three (H3), I anticipate that participants of incentive programs who
grew up in nonmetropolitan communities and are more familiar with the realities of
living in these areas are less likely to exhibit biased projections of their anticipated utility
for practicing in a nonmetropolitan areas and are therefore less likely to default on their
service obligation. I make this prediction because choices informed by personal memory
or experiences are more likely to result in accurate predictions of future preferences
(Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Alternatively, I expect that participants who grew up in
larger communities – i.e., micropolitan and metropolitan areas – are more likely to
exhibit projection bias and default on their service obligations. Individuals with previous
experiences in shortage area locations, including nonmetropolitan areas, are more likely
to accurately predict their preferences in their future state, s, resulting in a higher quality
participation decision.

5 A higher incentive value also has the potential to exacerbate present-biased preferences. Individuals who
exhibit present-biased preferences trade off earlier vs. delayed benefits (or costs) differently depending on
how immediate the incentive is received. Those who exhibit present-biased preferences give stronger
relative weight to the earlier benefit as it approaches in time (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Participants
may experience heightened present-biased preferences by receiving larger monetary incentives.
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Within the SLP, I hypothesize (H4) that longer training periods are likely to
exacerbate projection bias and therefore the probability of default. The greater the
temporal gap in deciding to participate and carrying out the decision, the greater the
probability that inaccurate predictions about future preferences are made, and thus, the
greater the probability of default. Figure 3.1 helps to visualize the time gap between an
individual’s current state, s’, when they make the decision to participate at points A or B
and their future state, s, at point C when their service obligation is carried out. Because
the temporal gap between the decision to participate and carrying out the decision is
much shorter in the LRP and does not differ among professions, I expect longer training
periods to only influence projection bias among participants of the SLP.
Gender could also influence one’s current or future state, and thus has the
potential to influence one’s predictions of future preferences. There is much media
attention given to the differences in work and familial roles taken on between men and
women. The Pew Research Center (2015) reports that women adjust their careers more
than men to meet familial needs. Additionally, a study by Field and Lennox (1996) found
that gender affects future career choices and that a cohort of women in medicine
indicated their career choice is influenced by their desire to have a family in the future. In
a study concerning gender-related factors in recruiting rural physicians, Ellsbury et al.
(2002) found that women were significantly more likely than men to attribute more
importance to opportunities for their partner or spouse, the availability of child-care, and
flexible scheduling in making practice location decisions. Thus, it is possible that women
who participate in a financial incentive program may be more likely than men to change
their original plans of practicing in a shortage area in favor of accommodating a partner’s
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location preferences or for other familial considerations. Therefore, in hypothesis five
(H5) I anticipate that men are less likely to exhibit projection bias compared to women,
as men are less likely to change or adjust their career plans to meet familial needs.
3.4 Variables Used to Test Hypotheses
The variables used in this research are common among studies that describe the
effectiveness of recruitment and retention of healthcare financial incentive programs
(Rabinowitz et al. 2001; Jackson et al. 2003; Pathman et al. 2004a; Pathman et al. 2004b;
Daniels et al. 2007). Additionally, these variables capture characteristics of participants
or the state of the program under which individuals participated to provide insight into
the state, s’, of participants.
The default cost condition under which individuals agreed to participate in the
incentive programs helps to capture how bound a participate may feel to their
commitment to practice in a shortage area. These conditions are estimated based on the
incentive program start date and anticipated graduation date articulated in the data. These
estimates also were used to identify the nominal incentive value individuals received.
Additionally, the research uses population of the town from which participants
graduated high school to capture experience in nonmetropolitan areas. The analysis
categorizes these hometown populations into noncore (populations less than 10,000),
micropolitan (populations between 10,000 and 50,000), and metropolitan (populations
greater than 50,000) communities.
Length of training (LOT) captures the temporal gap between when a participant
chooses to participate in the SLP or LRP, at points A and B in Figure 3.1, and when the
decision is actually carried out, represented by point C. Length of training is estimated
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based on the individual’s career and specialty – e.g., medicine, dentistry, physician
assistant – and the average length of training, including education and residency training,
required of the particular career.
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CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND DATA
4.1 Sample
Panel data were collected from the Health Professions Tracking Service (HPTS),
an annually updated repository maintained by the College of Public Health at the
University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC). In operation since 1995, the HPTS
database maintains Nebraska’s licensed healthcare professionals. It is kept up to date by
annually surveying Nebraska healthcare providers as well as semi-annually surveying
practice location administrators. The combined provider and practice location survey
responses allow the HPTS to link the provider and practice location data in a relational
database (UNMC Center for Health Policy 2012). The HPTS tracks essential information
on licensed healthcare providers in Nebraska including profession, specialty
area, practice locations and dates of practice in each location, city of high school
graduation, gender, participation in the State of Nebraska Rural Incentive Programs, as
well as the program outcome – e.g., completed or defaulted. The HPTS works
collaboratively with the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, which
provided the dataset for this research.
UNMC’s College of Public Health has compared data from the HPTS to the
American Medical Association (AMA) Physician Masterfile, a database commonly used
for researching the supply of physicians as well as recruitment and retention rates of
physicians who have participated in federal or state incentive programs (UNMC Center
for Health Policy 2012). In a comparison study conducted by UNMC, physician supply
estimated by the AMA Physician Masterfile is up to 30 percent greater than the supply
reported by the HPTS. The HPTS is likely to report a more accurate picture of the supply
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of healthcare providers in Nebraska, as it accounts for hours worked per week and is
updated annually.
The sample collected from the HPTS contains 758 observations and includes
participants from the SLP and LRP. The sample includes 261 individuals who
participated in the SLP between 1979 and 2015 and 489 who participated in the LRP
between 1994 and 2015. The summary statistics found in Table 4.1 reflect this sample of
participants. Additionally, eight individuals participated in both programs, and are not
included in the SLP and LRP counts. The data encompass all healthcare professions
eligible to receive funds from the Nebraska Rural Incentive Programs: physicians, nurse
practitioners, physician assistants, dentists, clinical psychologists, licensed mental health
practitioners, pharmacists, occupational therapists, and physical therapists. All
individuals in the dataset are past or current participants of the SLP or LRP who have
practiced in Nebraska.
Supplemental data were collected to enhance the information provided by the
HPTS. Data on Nebraska town populations were imported from the 1970 through 2010
U.S. Censuses. Additionally, the OMB designations of Nebraska counties were imported
from the Office of Management and Budget. This information was used in determining
the population size and the metro- or non-metro- designation of the high school
graduation city of each program participant, helping to capture the experience or
familiarity individuals have of living in a non-metro location. Additionally, the OMB
designation is used to classify the initial shortage area location. Also, because state
shortage areas are reviewed and adjusted every three years, counties designated as
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shortage areas over time were imported from the Nebraska Department of Health and
Human Services.
To capture the length of time a participant spent in training, I added a length of
training variable (LOT) that was estimated based on the average length of training
required for the individual’s profession – e.g., medicine, dentistry, physician assistant –
and specialty – e.g., family practice, general surgery (All Allied Health Schools 2016; All
Nursing Schools 2016; American Associations of Colleges of Pharmacy 2016; American
Dental Education Association 2015; American Physical Therapy Association 2015;
Careers in Psychology; Physician Assistant Education Association 2013; Washington
University School of Medicine in St. Louis 2012). LOT includes professional school
education as well as time spent in residency training.
To capture the conditions under which individuals participated in the incentive
programs, I included a categorical default condition (DC) variable and incentive value
variable. Beginning practice dates and anticipated graduation dates were used to estimate
what default and incentive value conditions applied to participants when they started the
program. Table 4.1 provides the number of individuals participating under each default
and incentive condition. Note that in default condition three in the SLP, approximately
two-thirds of subjects in this period have yet to reach a program outcome and are
therefore excluded from the analysis. Thus, results regarding this variable may not reflect
the long-term results of this default condition.
For both the SLP and LRP, I adjusted nominal incentive values into real values to
capture the changes in the real value of the incentive, under the assumption that
individuals received the maximum incentive value in each program per year. The
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adjusted incentive value (AIV) is the incentive variable used in the analysis. A summary
of the nominal value of incentives and eligible recipients is summarized in Table 4.2.
Within the SLP from 1979 to 1990, the incentive was a low-interest loan for medical
students. Because I am interested in the relative effect of incentive values, I code the
monetary value of the low-interest loan as zero. While this incentive undoubtedly
provided positive monetary benefit, I made this specification in order to include these
participants in the regression, as nearly half of SLP participants participated under this
incentive condition. Furthermore, SLP participants who received a forgivable student
loan would have also experienced savings due to foregone interest expenses, which is
unknown and unaccounted for. Therefore, even after specifying the incentive value as
zero for SLP participants who received a low-interest loan, the analysis accurately
compares relative values across incentive conditions.
The duration of practice (in months) in one’s initial shortage area is also
calculated based on practice location start and end dates. The data used in the analysis
only include participants who have completed or defaulted on their service obligation.
This variable captures the length of time participants remain in their initial shortage area,
and will be used in the survival analysis. Table 4.4 presents the proportion of initial
shortage area locations by OMB classifications. Table 4.5 provides the mean and median
duration of practice in the initial shortage area as well as the standard deviation of SLP
and LRP participants.
The sample in this study is limited to participants of the State of Nebraska Rural
Incentive Programs. Healthcare providers who have participated in federal incentive
programs, such as the National Health Service Corps, were not included in this study.
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Additionally, I exclude program participants who have not yet completed or defaulted on
their obligation. Thus, current students and residents are excluded from the sample
because they have not yet reached a program outcome of completed or defaulted.
Similarly, if a participant is licensed and currently practicing under obligation, but has
not yet arrived at a program outcome, the participant is excluded from the analysis. With
these exclusions, the sample includes 615 observations, 220 in the SLP and 395 in the
LRP.
In the survival analysis, I only include participants who started practice after the
HPTS began systematically tracking provider practice locations and duration. In other
words, participants who began practicing prior to 1995, the year the HPTS started
tracking provider locations, are excluded from this regression. This ensures accuracy of
the data used in the analysis. Furthermore, recall that the survival analysis only includes
participants who have reached a completed program outcome. This ensures that the
length of time spent in one’s initial practice location was a shortage area. With these
exclusions, the survival analysis sample includes 276 observations.
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Table 4.1
Summary Statistics
Participants by Default
Condition
1: 24% interest (‘79-‘97)
2: 24% interest & semi-annual
letter (‘98-’06)
3: 150% principal + 8% interest &
semi-annual letter (‘07-’15)
4: 125% funds received (‘94-’15)

Participants by Incentive
Conditions
1: Low interest loan (’79-’90)
2: 10K, 5K (‘91-‘98)
3: 20K, 10K (‘98-‘15)
4: 20K, 10K (’94-’05)
5: 40K, 20K (’06,-’15)

Program Outcomes
(2 outcomes unknown in SLP)

Profession

SLP n=261
1: 142; 54.4%
2: 59; 22.6%
3: 60; 23.0%

LRP n=489
4: 489; 100%

1: 94; 36%
2: 48; 18.4%
3: 119; 45.6%

4: 234; 47.8%
5: 255; 52.1%

Default: 114; 43.7%
Complete: 106; 40.6%
In Practice: 16; 6.1%
In Training: 23; 8.8%

Default: 41; 8.4%
Complete: 354; 72.3%
In Practice: 94; 19.2%

Medicine: 170
PA: 25
Dental: 33
Mental Health: 33

Medicine: 150
PA: 116
NP: 53
Dental: 26
Mental Health: 39
OT: 40
PT: 31
Pharmacy: 34
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Table 4.2
Nominal Incentive Values and Eligible Recipients
Program
SLP

Time
Period
1979-1990:

Nominal
Incentive Value
Low-interest loan

Eligible Recipients

1991-1997

$10,000

Medical students

$5,000

Physician assistant students

$20,000

Medical and dental students

$10,000

Physician assistant and graduate-level
mental healthcare students

1994-2005

$20,000
$10,000

2006-2015

$40,000
$20,000

Physicians, dentists, psychologists, nurse
practitioners, physician assistants,
licensed mental health practitioners,
pharmacists, occupational therapists, and
physical therapists

1998-2015:

LRP

Medical students

Table 4.3
Percentage of Initial Service Obligations by OMB Designation
SA Type
Metropolitan
Micropolitan
Non core

% Of Initial Service
Obligations
4.4%
28.8%
66.8%

Table 4.4
Mean and Median Months in Initial Shortage Area by Program Type
Program Type

Mean

Median

SLP
LRP

55.28
70.47

37.00
53.00

Standard
Deviation
36.79
52.40
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL MODEL
5.1 Probit Model
I use a probit model to analyze participants’ program outcomes. A probit model is
appropriate because the program outcome variable is binary, or has two possible
outcomes. Participants either complete or default on their service obligation. The purpose
of this model is to determine what observable explanatory variables increase the
probability of a completed program outcome, leading to insight on what variables may
contribute to or counteract the forces of projection bias. The model considers
characteristics of the SLP and LRP programs, as well as variables unique to program
participants.
The dependent variable is a binary measure of the program outcome, and captures
whether the participant completed or defaulted on their service obligation. If a participant
completed their service obligation in the SLP, they practiced in a state-designated
shortage area for the same number of years they received the incentive. If a LRP
participant completed their service obligation, they practiced for three years in a statedesignated shortage area. If a participant defaulted on their service obligation, they may
have defaulted while in school or residency if participating in the SLP, or after spending
some amount of time in a state-designated shortage area, but less than what is required of
their obligation in the SLP or LRP.
I analyze the data for each program separately and then in a pooled analysis. The
model includes independent variables including default condition (DC), adjusted
incentive value (AIV), length of training (LOT), gender (male), the categorical
population of their hometown, and an error term, which is normally distributed in a probit
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model. The justifications of these variables are discussed in Chapter 3. The probit model
for this analysis is described by
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽!
∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑇 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀.
It should be noted that in regressions involving the LRP, the default condition
variable changes to a time period variable, as the default cost remained constant. The
time periods are reflective of the same time frame as the default conditions in the SLP
program. Following this time period schedule allows for comparisons between SLP and
LRP participants who participated during the same time period.
In the pooled analysis, I include a program type – i.e., SLP – variable. In a second
variation of the pooled regression, I include interaction terms between the SLP and TP
and SLP and LOT. These interactions were selected because previous studies suggest the
temporal gap, which differs between programs, is likely to increase bias, as well as to
capture the influence of default cost changes over time in the SLP. The interactions allow
for understanding and comparison of the relationship between the program type and
variables that are expected to influence the magnitude of projection bias among
participants. The interacted probit model is described by
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽!
∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑇 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽!
∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽!
∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑇 + 𝜀.
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5.2 Survival Analysis
I conduct a survival analysis to model the length of time in months spent in the
initial shortage area location among participants who completed their service obligation.
Survival analysis is appropriate because it is used to analyze duration data, or how long
until an event occurs. In this research, the duration measured is the number of months
spent in one’s initial shortage area location until they exit to a new location. Using a
Kaplan-Meier survival function, I compare survival probabilities between SLP and LRP
participants to determine if there is a significant difference in the survival proportion by
program type. However, a Kaplan-Meier survival function only allows comparison of one
variable (in this case, program type) and fails to take into account other variables that
may influence the length of survival in a shortage area, so further analysis must
accompany these results.
Next, I conduct a Cox regression analysis to observe associations between
variables and survival. The dependent variable is the hazard – i.e., the probability of
leaving the initial shortage area. The predictor variables used in this regression are the
same as those used in the aggregated probit model – program type, adjusted incentive
value, time period of participation, LOT, gender, and the categorical variable of
hometown population. The Cox regression helps distinguish individual contributions of
these variables on the probability of exiting the initial practice location.
Conducting a survival analysis provides insight into what variables may influence
projection bias after entering and practicing in a shortage area location. It is possible that
individuals exiting their initial shortage area upon completion of their service obligation
over-estimated their experienced utility of practicing in a shortage area, at least compared
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to those who remained in their initial location beyond the time required of them. While it
is possible these participants exited their initial shortage area for a different shortage area,
the analysis does not test for this.
Because the survival analysis excludes participants who defaulted on their service
obligation, or individuals who exhibited early signs of projection bias, it may be more
difficult to draw conclusions about what variables influencing the hazard of exiting the
initial location are caused by projection bias, rather than other external determinants of
retention including family, community, and practice satisfaction.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS & DISCUSSION
6.1 Results
6.1.1 Probit Model
Results for the probit model regression for the SLP program are provided in Table
6.1 Results show that LOT is strongly significant and therefore the longer an individual
spends in training, the more likely they are to default on their SLP service obligation.
Additionally, SLP participants in default condition three (DC3) are more likely to default
on their service obligation, which is significant at the 5 percent level. Participants in
default condition two (DC2) are less likely to default, although this is not statistically
significant. While not significant, the gender (male) coefficient is negative indicating that
males may be less likely than females to default in the SLP. The hometown population
coefficients are both positive, indicating that those who grew up in a micropolitan or
metropolitan area are more likely to default on their obligation compared to those whose
hometown is a nonmetropolitan, noncore area. Overall, the SLP probit model supports
that longer training periods result in greater likelihood of projection bias (H4). Although
insignificant, the direction of the coefficients align with hypotheses regarding AIV (H2),
hometown population (H3), and gender (H5). The prediction that changes to the cost of
default will decrease default rate (H1) is not strongly supported in this model, as DC3 is
positive and significant, although DC2 moves in the opposite direction.
The probit model for LRP uses the same variables as the SLP model, but recall
that the time period variables now reflect the time frame of the SLP default conditions
changes, as discussed in Chapter 5. This variable captures any unobserved forces
influencing default during the different time periods. Results for this model are found in
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Table 6.2. Significance for time period two (TP2) is found at the 5 percent level. Thus,
LRP participants from 1998-2006 are less likely to default on their service obligation.
Note that the gender (male) coefficient is negative in this model and approaching
marginal significance, lending some support for H5. The remaining variables show no
significance, which is likely due to differences in LRP program design that reduce the
likelihood of projection bias. Thus, it is unlikely the any changes made to the structure of
this program will influence program outcomes in a meaningful way.
Next, I analyzed the aggregated data on participants of both programs. By
aggregating the samples, statistical comparisons can be made between the two programs.
Results for the uninteracted aggregated probit model can be found in Table 6.3. A second
model interacts the SLP with LOT and time periods two (TP2) and three (TP3). Results
for the interacted aggregated probit model can be found in Table 6.4.
Based on the uninteracted model, SLP program participants are significantly more
likely than LRP participants to default on their service obligation. LOT is marginally
significant, indicating that the longer the training of an individual in either program, the
more likely they are to default on their service obligation, supporting H4. The gender
(male) variable is also slightly significant, suggesting that men are less likely to default
on their service obligation (H5).
In the interacted model, the interaction between SLP and LOT shows significance
at the 1 percent level. This indicates that participants of the SLP with longer training
periods are more likely to default on their obligation compared to LRP participants of
similar training length. For example, a dentist in the SLP is more likely to default than a
dentist in the LRP. The SLP and time period interactions are also significant, suggesting
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that participants of the SLP program in both TP2 and TP3 are more likely default on their
service obligation compared to LRP participants of the same time periods. The
significance in these interactions further support that participants in the SLP are more
likely to default than those of the LRP. Similar to the uninteracted model, gender (male)
is marginally significant with a negative coefficient (H5). TP2 is significant at the 5
percent level, indicating that all incentive program participants between 1998 and 2006
are less likely to default on their service obligation.
Table 6.1
Probit Model for SLP
Coefficients

Point Estimate
(Std. Error)
Intercept (β0)
-1.336***
(0.422)
SLP DC2 (β11)
-0.187
(0.412)
SLP DC3 (β12)
0.9462**
(0.460)
AIV (β2)
0.00001
(0.00002)
LOT (β3)
0.187***
(0.061)
Male (β4)
-0.243
(0.215)
Hometown Population (β51)
0.404
10,000 – 49,999
(0.369)
Hometown Population (β52)
0.334
50,000 <
(0.423)
AIC
237.97
Significance codes: 0.01*** ; 0.05** ; 0.1*

Pr(>|z|)
0.002
0.650
0.040
0.389
0.002
0.258
0.274
0.429
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Table 6.2
Probit Model for LRP
Coefficients

Point Estimate
(Std. Error)
Intercept (β0)
-0.586
(0.385)
TP2 (β11)
-0.697**
(1998-2006)
(0.304)
TP3 (β12)
0.201
(2007-2015)
(0.352)
AIV (β2)
-0.00004
(0.00002)
LOT (β3)
0.115
(0.089)
Male (β4)
-0.363
(0.243)
Hometown Population (β51)
-0.040
10,000 – 49,999
(0.302)
Hometown Population (β52)
-0.234
50,000 <
(0.338)
AIC
196.81
Significance codes: 0.01*** ; 0.05** ; 0.1*

Pr(>|z|)
0.128
0.022
0.569
0.140
0.196
0.136
0.896
0.489
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Table 6.3
Probit Model for Aggregated Data
Coefficients

Point Estimate
(Std. Error)
Intercept (β0)
-1.558***
(0.269)
Program Type: SLP (β1)
1.262***
(0.187)
AIV (β2)
-0.000003
(0.000009)
LOT (β3)
0.073*
(0.039)
Male (β4)
-0.291*
(0.155)
Hometown Population (β51)
0.101
10,000 – 49,999
(0.220)
Hometown Population (β52)
-0.068
50,000 <
(0.245)
TP2 (1998-2007) (β61)
-0.190
(0.224)
TP3 (2007-2015) (β62)
0.416
(0.276)
AIC
437.34
Significance codes: 0.01*** ; 0.05** ; 0.1*

Pr(>|z|)
<0.001
<0.001
0.711
0.062
0.061
0.647
0.781
0.397
0.132
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Table 6.4
Interacted Probit Model for Aggregated Data
Coefficients

Point Estimate
(Std. Error)
Intercept (β0)
-0.893***
(0.332)
Program Type: SLP (β1)
-0.383
(0.534)
AIV (β2)
-0.000003
(0.00001)
LOT (β3)
-0.0006
(0.060)
Male (β4)
-0.303*
(0.158)
Hometown Population (β51)
0.161
10,000 – 49,999
(0.223)
Hometown Population (β52)
-0.023
50,000 <
(0.250)
TP2 (β61)
-0.615**
(1998-2006)
(0.293)
TP3 (β62)
-0.051
(2007-2015)
(0.307)
SLP * TP2
0.770*
(0.463)
SLP * TP3
1.192**
(0.493)
SLP * LOT
0.205***
(0.078)
AIC
432.05
Significance codes: 0.01*** ; 0.05** ; 0.1*

Pr(>|z|)
0.007
0.473
0.791
0.992
0.055
0.470
0.927
0.036
0.869
0.096
0.016
0.008

6.1.2 Survival Analysis
The Kaplain-Meier survival function provides a graphical representation of
survival probability between participants of the SLP and LRP program in Figure 6.1.
Approximately 80 percent of participants in the SLP and LRP program remain in their
initial practice location after 36 months of beginning practice there. With a p-value of
0.049, the Kaplain-Meier survival function suggests that there are differences in the
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length of practice in one’s initial practice location based on program type. However, this
graphical representation is insufficient in determining predictors of the probability of
exiting the initial shortage area location, as it does not take into account variables beyond
program type. Thus, a cox hazard regression is conducted.

Figure 6.1: Survival Probability by Program Type
The results from the cox hazard regression, found in Table 6.5, show that TP2,
TP3 and the interaction between SLP and TP3 are strongly significant. Additionally, LOT
is significant at the 5 percent level and metropolitan hometown variable is marginally
significant. The coefficient for TP2 and TP3 is positive, indicating that the probability of
these participants exiting their initial shortage area increases, and that these participants
are more likely to exit than those in TP1. For example, the hazard ratio for TP2 is 2.47. A
hazard ratio greater than one indicates that participants of TP2 are exiting their shortage
area faster than participants of TP1. The same is true for participants in TP3.
Additionally, the coefficient for the interaction term between the SLP and TP3 is greater
than one, indicating that participants of the SLP in TP3 are significantly more likely to
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exit their initial practice location compared to SLP program participants in TP1. Note that
in this analysis there are participants, particularly in TP3, who have yet to exit their initial
shortage area, and therefore their total survival time is incomplete. These observations are
called right-censored, and the cox regression correctly accounts for this type of data.
The negative coefficient of the LOT variable suggests that the probability of
exiting the initial shortage area location – i.e., hazard of exiting – decreases. Thus, the
longer the training, the more time an individual will stay in their initial location. For
example, an individual with seven years of training compared to an individual with two
years of training results in a hazard ratio of 0.64. This means that those who train for
seven years are 36 percent less likely than those with two years of training to exit the
initial shortage area location.
The variable for those who grew up in a metropolitan area is marginally
significant with a positive coefficient and has a hazard ratio of 1.35. This indicates that
participants with a metropolitan background are more likely to exit their initial shortage
area compared to those with a noncore, nonmetropolitan upbringing.

56
Table 6.5
Cox Hazard Regression for Aggregated Data
Coefficients

Point Estimate
Coefficients
0.005
0.000006
-0.090**
0.098
0.130

SLP (β1)
AIV (β2)
LOT (β3)
Male (β4)
Hometown Population (β51)
10,000 – 49,999
Hometown Population (β52)
0.300*
50,000 <
TP2 (β61)
0.904***
(1998-2006)
TP3 (β62)
1.755***
(2007-2015)
SLP * TP2
0.5240
SLP * TP3
2.618***
SLP * LOT
0.061
R square
0.303
Likelihood ratio test
107.8
Wald test
113.3
Score (logrank) test
161.9
Significance codes: 0.01*** ; 0.05** ; 0.1*

Exp(coef)

Pr(>|z|)

1.005
1.000
0.914
1.103
1.138

0.994
0.602
0.044
0.437
0.481

1.349

0.097

2.470

<0.001

5.785

<0.001

1.689
13.71
1.063

0.246
<0.001
0.488

p=0
p=0
p=0

6.2 Discussion
6.2.1 Probit Model
This analysis strongly supports that SLP participants are more likely than LRP
participants to default on their service obligation. There is also variation in the probability
of default within the SLP based on variables that are related to the likelihood of
projection bias, and results show that the longer one spends in training, the more likely
they are to default on their service obligation in the SLP. For example, those with longer
training periods in the SLP, such as physicians, are more likely to default compared to
those whose training periods are shorter in length, such as physicians assistants.
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These results indicate that SLP participants and those with longer training periods
in the SLP are more prone to exhibiting projection bias. Because one of the key
differences in the programs is the duration between when the incentive is delivered and
when the service is carried out, which is also influenced by the length of training for SLP
participants, it suggests that the temporal gap exacerbates the effects of projection bias.
That is, the longer the time between making the decision to participate and fulfilling the
service obligation, the more likely one is to exhibit projection bias because temporal
proximity influences our ability to correctly predict or anticipate our future preferences.
Gilbert and Wilson (2007) discuss that predicting the future requires mental
simulation of an event one has not experienced. In deciding to participate in an incentive
program, one likely imagines or calls upon memories to predict what it would be like to
practice in a shortage area. The problem, however, is that those simulations tend to omit
certain features of the experience, which worsens when the event becomes more
temporally distant (Gilbert and Wilson 2007). Students may not consider all aspects of
practicing in a shortage area. For instance, they may spend less time considering features
unrelated to practicing medicine or having their student debt paid off like having limited
options of where to practice, which influences their proximity to family, having a
significant other who prefers living in a city, or fewer social activities available.
Predicting future preferences can also be prone to error if predictions are based on a small
number of memories or previous experiences or if they lack context (Gilbert and Wilson
2007).
Not only are predictions of future preferences most likely incorrect when the
temporal gap is long, there are also inaccuracies when an individual’s circumstances are
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changing (Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Students in the healthcare field are exposed to
many facets and specialties in healthcare throughout their training. Thus, considering
experiences that occur within the training period may also be contributing to the
significance of the LOT and program type variable. Medical students, for example, must
commit to practicing in a primary care-related field in order to receive funds through the
SLP. However, a portion of their training is devoted to exploring specialty areas through
rotations, including those outside of primary care. It is possible that medical students who
default on their obligation do so after discovering a preference for a specialty area outside
of primary care. By underestimating that specialty preferences may change over time,
program participants entering fields where they have the option to further specialize may
be even more prone to exhibit projection bias.
Furthermore, the benefit of the incentive may no longer be salient for SLP
participants by the time they are practicing in a shortage area. Because they received the
benefit while in school and are no longer receiving such an incentive when carrying out
their obligation, it could increase the likelihood of SLP participants to default on their
service obligation, especially if they were particularly motivated to participate due to the
incentive, rather than the mission of working with underserved populations. In the LRP,
program incentives should still be salient while they are practicing in a shortage area
because they receive the benefits at that time. Overall, these results confirm the
hypothesis (H4) that LOT exacerbates the propensity of exhibiting projection bias within
the SLP.
Results do not strongly support the hypothesis that increasing the perception of
how bound one is to fulfilling their obligation – i.e., by changing the cost of default – will
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result in a higher probability of completion. Although not significant, DC2 in the SLP
model indicates that participants in this condition are less likely to default than those in
DC1. Because the financial cost of defaulting does not differ between these conditions, it
suggests that sending semi-annual letters reminding participants of their obligation may
have positively influenced the completion rate. However, models also indicate that those
in DC3 are more likely to default, even in the presence of semi-annual letters and a
default cost of 150 percent plus interest. However, two-thirds of subjects participating
under DC3 have yet to reach a program outcome, and are therefore not included in the
analysis. Thus, the DC3 result may not reflect the long-term outcomes of this condition.
The default condition in the LRP remained constant across time, thus the
significance in the LRP model TP2 variable captures unobserved forces influencing
default during this time period. Within the interacted aggregated model, participants of
both programs in TP2 are less likely to default. This variable represents unobserved
trends affecting the probability of default, as well as the change in the default condition in
the SLP program, suggesting that this DC2 may have positively influenced the program
outcome.
The aggregated interacted model also shows that participants of the SLP in TP2
and TP3 are more likely to default than LRP participants of the same time period. This
further supports that SLP participants are more likely to default than LRP participants
across time, even when the cost of default increased in the SLP program. While the
expectation that increasing the cost of default would reduce the probability of default is
not strongly supported in this data, behavioral economic research supports that prompting
individuals to think more carefully about how preferences change over time results in less
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biased predictions. It could be the case that semi-annual letters and the financial penalties
are not explicit enough to prompt such contemplation.
The gender (male) coefficient is negative in every model specification, and is
marginally significant in two of the four models. This supports the hypothesis (H5) that
men are less likely than women to default on their service obligation. While the lack of
significance could be due to the size of the data set, it is worthy to point out the direction
of the estimate. Studies support that women are more likely than their male counterparts
to change their career plans or behaviors due to familial responsibilities (Brotherton et al.
1997). These findings suggest that men may be more likely to follow-through and
complete their original plans to practice in a healthcare shortage area compared to their
female counterparts, indicating men may be less prone to exhibiting projection bias in
this scenario.
A high percentage of physicians who currently practice in nonmetropolitan areas
grew up in similar settings, suggesting that those with experience in nonmetropolitan
communities are more likely to return to these geographic areas (Rabinowitz et al. 1999).
An individual calls upon their memories in predicting their future utility from an
experience that has not yet occurred (Gilbert and Wilson 2007), and therefore it is likely
individuals consider their previous experiences in nonmetropolitan areas when making
program participation decisions. Participants with experience living in a nonmetropolitan
area are likely to have a greater understanding of their taste for living in these areas, and
are therefore less likely to have biased predictions of preference for living there in the
future. However, the relationship between hometown population and the likelihood of
completing the service obligation is insignificant in every model specification. The SLP
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model does indicate that participants who grew up in a micropolitan or metropolitan
community are more likely to default on their service obligations, which supports H3, yet
the LRP model suggests the opposite. Furthermore, the aggregated models indicate that
those who grew up in a micropolitan city are more likely to default while those with a
metropolitan background are less likely to default. The small proportion of participants
with metropolitan or micropolitan backgrounds could contribute to the insignificance and
conflicting direction of hometown population variables, as only 10 percent and 13
percent of program participants in the analysis are of a metropolitan and micropolitan
backgrounds, respectively.
The AIV appears to have no influence on the probability of defaulting or
completing a program outcome. This is the case with and without including SLP
participants who received the low-interest loan. While greater incentive values may
entice more individuals to participate in healthcare financial incentive programs, it
appears that the value of the incentive does not influence one’s likelihood of completing
or defaulting on their obligation. Thus, the impact of varying incentive values does not
appear to influence the propensity of exhibiting projection bias. The consistent
insignificance of this variable is an interesting result, as it suggests that the value of
incentives healthcare professionals receive doesn’t influence the likelihood that one will
be recruited and fulfill a service obligation in a shortage area. In combination with weak
evidence that default conditions deter default outcomes, it appears that individuals are
influenced by factors beyond financial considerations of their service contract in making
default or fulfillment decisions, and that financial incentives or penalties may not be
adequate in prompting individuals to accurately predict future preferences.
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6.2.2 Other Considerations
LOT is a consistent variable across models involving SLP participants, leading to
the conclusion that LOT leads to greater likelihood of defaulting on service-obligations
within student-targeted programs. This is certainly influenced by physicians, who have
the longest training of all professionals in the data. While physicians could be more likely
to default if salaries in non-shortage areas were markedly higher than those in shortage
areas, evidence on physician salaries suggests that this is not the case. The Center for
Studying Health Systems Change (2005) reports the difference between metro and nonmetro physician income is negligible. Furthermore, after adjusting for cost of living in
metro and non-metro areas, adjusted physician income is actually greater in non-metro
areas. Because of this, and lack of usable, spatially explicit data on incomes across
professions, income earnings between metro and non-metro areas were not utilized in the
regression.
6.2.3 Survival Analysis
Because this analysis excludes all participants who defaulted on their service
obligation prior to or shortly after entering a shortage area, it excludes those subjects who
exhibited initial signs of projection bias. By defaulting before beginning practice in a
shortage area, individuals demonstrated their imperfection at predicting what future
preferences would result in the greatest level of utility. Thus, by only including those who
have completed their service obligation, subjects in this analysis inherently have a lower
propensity of exhibiting projection bias in terms of their practice specialty and shortage
area location, as all spent the time required in their shortage area. However, recall that
equation 3 describes that individuals will complete their practice obligation if the
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difference in utility between their ideal practice location in state s and utility in the
shortage area location is less than the cost of default. Thus, even if participants complete
their practice obligation, projection bias-related forces may lead some practitioners to
systematically leave shortage areas earlier than others in pursuit of a practice location that
provides greater utility than their shortage area location. While the coefficients used in
this analysis are the same as in the probit analysis, I am cautious to suggest that these are
strong indicators of projection bias, rather than predictors of how soon one is likely to
exit their initial shortage area location.
This analysis found that the only variable that decreases the hazard of exiting the
initial shortage area is LOT, and the longer individuals spend in training results in a lower
hazard of participants exiting their initial shortage area. For example, a physician is
predicted to remain in their initial location longer than a physician assistant. This could
be influenced by the fact that those at the peak of their profession may have an
opportunity to own or buy-into their own healthcare practice. Ownership of practice is a
determinant of retention used in previous studies, and Pathman et al. (2004b) reports that
retention among incentive program participants is longer for those who owned their
practice.
The significance of the time period variables indicate that there are unobserved
forces influencing the hazard of exiting the shortage area during these time periods. I
anticipate that common determinants of retention that are not included in this analysis,
such as one’s satisfaction in the healthcare system, work-life balance factors, and familial
satisfaction in the community could be picked up in these variables. The interaction
between SLP and TP3 could also reflect these factors.
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Results indicate that those with a metropolitan background will spend less time in
the initial shortage area compared to those with a nonmetro upbringing. Although
previous studies indicate that one’s background is not related to how long they remain
practicing in their initial shortage area, this results supports the hypothesis (H3) that those
drawing upon experiences of living in a nonmetro area are less likely to have biased
predictions of the utility they will experience by living and working in similar areas.
6.3 Reducing Projection Bias in Healthcare Financial Incentive Programs
Incorrectly predicting how preferences will change over time decreases the
quality of decisions individuals make for themselves. Incorrectly predicting preferences
regarding practice location can have significant financial consequences both for the
individual and state and federal incentive program, making it increasingly important to
understand how the magnitude of projection bias can be reduced.
Initial predictions of future preferences require time, motivation, and cognitive
resources. When any of these are lacking, adjusting preferences are inaccurate and biases
will occur. Ubel, Loewenstein, and Jepson (2005) found that prompting individuals to
think more carefully about the process of adaptation could reduce projection bias. While I
expected that semi-annual letters and changes to the cost of default would induce
individuals to think more carefully about their preferences over time, results do not
strongly support default condition changes resulted in higher completion rates. Thus, it is
possible that a more explicit prompt, perhaps an exercise before or during the incentive
program application process, could help guide individuals to consider their experience in
professional school and how these experiences may influence their practice preferences
in the future. Furthermore, because a major cause of projection bias in healthcare
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financial incentive programs is caused by the temporal gap between when an incentive is
received and service obligation is carried out, prompting individuals to mentally simulate
what it is like to live and work in a shortage area and then correct for its temporal
location could help to overcome some bias (Gilbert, Gill and Wilson 2002). Such
correction could involve prompting individuals to consider features outside of medicine
that they may not otherwise consider, or prompting students to consider how their state
between the current time period and future will change.
If individuals do not invest adequate cognitive resources in assessing their future
preferences, it will cause their predictions to be overly influenced by current feelings
rather than by their knowledge of the event’s temporal location (Gilbert, Gill, and Wilson
2002). Thus, giving decisions adequate time to think about the utility these decisions will
provide when experienced across a variety of scenarios, temporal locations, or states is
important in reducing the magnitude of projection bias.
Programs may also consider limiting who is eligible for programs based on the
length of training remaining. It appears that student-targeted programs are best designed
for professionals with shorter training periods, which would shorten the temporal gap
between the time of deciding to participate and the time the service obligation is carried
out. If student-targeted programs were specifically designed for mid-level healthcare
professionals or if those with longer training periods received a financial incentive later
on in training–e.g., the end of school or beginning of residency–it could decrease the
magnitude of projection bias and improve outcomes of student-targeted programs.
Projection bias could also be reduced and program outcomes improved if the
financial incentive in the SLP were made salient at the time the program obligation is
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being fulfilled. One strategy to do so would be to wait to award a small portion of the
financial incentive once providers are practicing in a shortage area.
Continuing the practice of providing incentives to those with demonstrated
experience of living in nonmetro, underserved areas is important in mitigating the
strength of projection bias. It could also reduce bias and improve completion rates to
require that all participants experience a rotation in a shortage area location prior to
committing to an incentive program.
6.4 Limitations
The HPTS repository only tracks healthcare providers in Nebraska and western
Iowa. Thus, there is potential for bias due to missing data of those who left the State of
Nebraska and are no longer tracked through the HPTS. Additionally, a portion of the
HPTS is self-reported through provider surveys and relies solely on the response of
healthcare providers. Variables such as high school graduation city, for instance, are
missing from a portion of observations due to nonresponse and are excluded from the
analysis.
The timeline of the data collection and tracking of healthcare providers is a
limitation to this research. The first incentive program began in 1979, but HPTS tracking
didn’t start until 1995. While this primarily affects participants of the SLP, there is likely
missing data of location and duration of practice prior to 1995. The research controls for
this discrepancy by identifying providers whose first practice location in the HPTS
matches the service-obligation practice location reported by the Nebraska Department of
Health and Human Services to ensure data accuracy. This limitation only influences the
survival analysis regression, and is unlikely to affect the probit model regression, as it
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simply looks at the program outcome, and does not consider practice locations
immediately after training.
The cox hazard regression analysis does not take into account the subsequent
practice location. It is possible that even when individuals exit their initial shortage area,
they relocate to a different shortage area location. This analysis also does not account for
common determinants of retention such as workplace and community satisfaction,
practice and community attributes, or additional personal characteristics.
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Financial incentive programs are likely to become increasingly attractive to young
professionals. As the debt burden of students increases, so does the propensity to enroll in
a financial incentive program (Jackson et al. 2003). In order to influence the impact that
financial incentive programs have in addressing geographic healthcare disparities, it is
vital to analyze what program design features and participant characteristics are most
likely to result in completed program outcomes. Understanding the psychological forces
that are influenced by these features makes studying behavioral economic concepts such
as projection bias relevant in designing programs to alleviate underserved healthcare
populations.
This analysis addresses which elements of program design in student-targeted and
professional-targeted programs are likely to be influenced by projection bias, and if these
elements are expected to counteract or contribute to its prevalence. If design elements of
certain programs give way to the likelihood of projection bias, then the efficacy of these
programs may be hindered. Overall, this analysis supports that participants of studenttargeted programs are significantly more likely to exhibit projection bias, and therefore
default on service obligations. Furthermore, the longer students are in training, the more
likely they are to make biased predictions about their future practice preferences within
student-targeted programs such as the SLP. These results are likely caused by the
temporal gap between when the commitment to practice in a shortage area is made and
when the service obligation is carried out. The greater the time between these points
results in higher magnitudes of projection bias, and therefore higher likelihood of
defaulting on one’s service obligation. Although those who had longer training periods
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were more likely to exhibit projection bias in terms of fulfilling their practice obligation,
of those who did complete their obligation, participants with greater training periods had
a lower hazard of exiting their initial shortage location.
The extension of projection bias theory proposed in this thesis, along with
previous studies, suggest there is potential to decrease the magnitude of projection bias
by increasing the perception of how bound one is to fulfilling their obligation. While the
results of this research do not strongly support this claim, additional research could
provide insight into what features are likely to make participants feel more bound to their
obligation. High default costs do not appear to have a strong impact on biased predictions
or program completion rates. Conducting experiments to explore why financial penalties
do not correct behavior and what type of prompts would induce greater cognitive effort in
predicting future preferences, leading to de-biased decisions, could provide insight into
this observation.
By addressing the causes of projection bias and strategies to decrease its
prevalence, it is possible to improve program outcomes for student-targeted programs. By
inducing students to think more carefully about how their specialty and practice location
preferences may change over time, and the new experiences they will encounter
throughout the course of their training, individuals may decrease their bias by placing less
weight on their current preferences. Furthermore, providing student-targeted incentives to
mid-level healthcare providers could improve the outcomes of these programs because
they have shorter training periods.
Despite the many efforts and interventions that have been implemented by
medical schools, the federal and state governments, and healthcare systems,
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nonmetropolitan healthcare disparities persist, requiring that additional research,
innovation, and collaboration are needed among stakeholders to achieve long-term
solutions to this issue.
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